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ABSTRACT 
According to the Verizon 2018 Data Breach Investigations Report , 321 POS terminals (user devices) 
were involved in data breaches in 2017 [1]. These data breaches involved standalone POS terminals 
as well as associated controller systems. This paper examines a standalone Point-of-Sale (POS) 
system commonly used in smaller retail stores and restaurants to extract unencrypted data and 
identify possible violations of the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) 
requirement to protect stored cardholder data. Persistent storage (flash memory chips) were 
removed from the devices and their contents were successfully acquired. Information about the 
device and the code running on it was successfully extracted, although no PCI DSS data storage 
violations were identified. 
Keywords: POS device, PCI DSS, compliance, data extraction, chip-off 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Data breaches involving Point-of-Sale (POS) 
devices are becoming commonplace. These 
breaches are happening in many industries, and 
no industry seems to be immune [16] . A short 
list of recent POS breaches would include 
@ 2019 ADFSL 
restaurants (Applebee's, Arby's, Sonic, Chili 's, 
Zippys', Subway, etc.), health care facilities 
( Oregon clinic), hospitality facilities (Holiday 
Inn, Hyatt), and various retail stores (Forever 
21 , Target [12], Home Depot , etc.). Even POS 
vendors, payment system and service providers 
such as Harbortouch, DataPoint POS, and 
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Heartland Payment Systems [11], are not 
immune [l]. 
Many POS systems consists of a workstation 
or server (controller) running a mainstream 
operating system and a POS terminal or device 
that reads the card. In such systems, the 
controller executes the processing and 
communication tasks. Other POS systems 
consist only of a POS device or terminal, which 
has the capability to store and process some 
subset of the card and transaction data, and the 
device or terminal also communicates with a 
remote system to execute the transaction. Past 
breaches have involved the standalone POS 
terminals or devices, while other breaches have 
involved an accompanying POS controller or 
server, which are often running an MS Windows 
operating system [8] . Past breaches have been 
attributed to a lack of security on the victim's 
POS terminal, POS controller, and/ or the data 
network on which the POS systems reside and 
over which they communicate. 
This paper presents a forensic first look at a 
common POS device found in smaller retail and 
restaurant establishments, specifically a 
VeriFone device deployed under the Verizon 
brand. These particular devices were selected for 
their widespread adoption in small and medium-
sized business more likely to have weak security 
programs [9], their standalone design which 
implies unprotected sensitive data will be on 
these devices instead of a separate controller, 
and their ready availability on the resale 
market. These devices were examined to 
identify plaintext operational information with 
security implications and to determine whether 
they violated the data storage requirement of 
the PCI DSS standard. An "Existing 
Data/ Specimens" form was filed with one of the 
author's Institutional Review Boards (IRB) for 
human subjects research in the event that PII 
was found or is found in the future, although 
none has been found to date in this work. 
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2. INTRODUCTION TO 
PCIDSS 
"PCI DSS is the global data security standard 
adopted by the payment card brands for all 
entities that process, store or transmit 
cardholder data and/ or sensitive authentication 
data. It consists of steps that mirror security 
best practices" [6]. The main goal of PCI DSS 
is to protect cardholder data using the PCI 
security standards. These standards "apply to 
all entities that store, process, and/ or transmit 
cardholder data. It covers technical and 
operational system components included in or 
connected to cardholder data" [6]. 
PCI DSS requirement 3 concerns protecting 
stored cardholder data. "Cardholder data refers 
to any information printed, processed, 
transmitted or stored in any form on a payment 
card" [6] . 
Guidelines to protect cardholder data 
include: 
Store data only as long as necessary for 
business 
Sensitive authentication data should not 
be stored after authorization ( even if it 
is encrypted) 
Only display either the first six or last 
four digits of the primary account 
number (PAN). 
Encrypt the PAN when stored 
Clearly document procedures to protect 
encryption keys 
Implement procedures to protect 
encryption keys 
Specific guidelines on how to protect the 
data are in Appendix 2. 
Storage of certain data elements on a 
payment card is permitted, for example the 
PAN can be stored with no encryption. The 
cardholder name, service code, and expiration 
date can be stored but must be encrypted (in 
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the Target case, such data was encrypted, but 
not immediately [131). The full track data (the 
data on the magnetic stripe), the 3-4 digit 
verification value (CAV, CVC, CVV, or CID), 
and the PIN cannot be stored in any form. 
Storage guidelines for cardholder data elements 
are in Table 2 [6]. 
3. THEORETICAL 
JUSTIFICATION 
Point of sale devices, and embedded systems in 
general, consist of four common functional 
components: persistent storage, volatile 
memory, a processor, and communications 
elements. Persistent storage contains the device 
firmware (bootloader and operating system), 
configuration data, and possibly other data 
written during the course of operation. Volatile 
memory (RAM) and processor contents are 
interesting only for a running system [10,14,15], 
and communication elements are interesting for 
the data t hey transmit on a live system as well 
as possible access vectors. We are specifically 
interested in residual and security relevant data 
available on a dead system, so we focused on 
persistent storage. In the case of the POS 
systems we examined, this persistent storage is 
made up of a ROM chip containing a bootloader 
and a flash memory chip soldered to one of the 
device's printed circuit boards. 
The flash memory on an embedded device 
like a POS system will contain operating system 
and related executable code, typically in 
compiled form. Configuration information, 
possibly including user account information, will 
also be stored m persistent storage. 
Additionally, the running system may write 
transaction or other data to t he flash memory. 
The contents of the flash memory may be 
encrypted in whole or in part using on-chip 
encryption or off-chip encryption implemented 
in hardware or software. Our goal in this work 
is to extract the raw contents of the flash 
memory and determine the data that can be 
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extracted and the possible security implications 
of access to that data. 
4. MOTIVATION 
Recently one of the authors visited a restaurant 
and paid with a credit card. The POS device 
was quite small and was the type t hat contacts 
the payment system provider directly via a 
telephone call. The call did not succeed, and 
after a few seconds the POS device printed two 
receipts. This worried the author somewhat -
was his payment information (name, credit card 
information, transaction information) still on 
the POS device, and if so, how long would it 
remain there until it was processed? 
The author noted the make and model of the 
POS device and contacted the payment system 
provider (Heartland Payment Systems). 
Heartland provided no help, except to state that 
they only provide the credit card charging 
system, and that any other information would 
have to come from Verizon. 
A call was made to Verizon customer 
support for VeriFone devices. During this call 
the author learned that the transaction 
information is only on the POS device until 
processed, and the unprocessed transactions are 
cached until batch processing can be done later 
in the day. They did not provide details on 
when the batch processing would occur as it can 
be done manually or automatically ( daily time 
set by the device operator). When the batch 
process is finished , the transaction information 
is deleted. 
This information caused the author concern: 
what if the POS device was stolen before the 
batch processing is performed, and is the 
transaction information securely deleted? 
5. DEVICE ACQUISITION 
One of the authors bought 3 used POS devices 
via craigslist. All were of the Verizon brand and 
were Verifone models; one was an Omni Vx570 
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model and two were Omni Vx610 models. 
These devices are the same type that the author 
had observed in his restaurant incident. The 
two Vx610 devices were owned by a catering 
company (food truck) whose owner said they 
CDFSL Proceedings 2019 
only connected to process transactions in the 
evening. The Vx570 model was owned by a 
bakery. One of the V erifone V x610 models used 
for this examination is shown in Figure 1. 
Figure 1. Verifone Vx610 POS device 
6. DATA EXTRACTION 
This section will detail the data extraction 
efforts. The first attempt included printing 
data, followed by a Joint Test Action Group 
(JTAG) access attempt and a chip-off 
extraction. 
6.1 Initial extraction 
It was decided to power up one device and see 
if any data could be extracted from it. The data 
extraction began with powering on the Vx570 
device and printing the last transaction. The 
printout began with a summary / detail report 
of transactions, which included the device 
owner's name, address, and phone number, 
followed by the information on the last batch 
processed ( date, time, batch# , terminal ID, list 
of transactions, their dollar amount, and total). 
This was followed by two printouts of the last 
transaction ( customer copy and merchant 
copy), which included: 
Device owner, address and phone 
number 
Terminal ID # 
@ 2019 ADFSL 
Transaction date & time 
Credit card type & last 4 digits of credit 
card number 
Transaction amount 
Credit card owner name 
Transaction approved/ not approved 
Batch # 
Authorization number 
These transaction copies were followed 
again by a summary and detail report of 
transactions as shown in Figure 2. 
The Vx570 device was briefly disassembled 
and reassembled to get a quick look at the 
motherboard. After reassembly, the device was 
turned on and immediately displayed an error 
message on the screen: "Security Alarm, 
Tampering Detected [20000] Please reboot". 
This message is known to be triggered by 
physical disassembly of the device case. 
Additionally, on one of the Vx610 devices a 
Verix Multi-Application Conductor (VMAC) 
Summary Report was printed, which contained 
information about the terminal: the OS version, 
the terminal type, the terminal serial number, 
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RAM, FLASH memory, and GID information 
(see VMAC Summary Report in Figure 3). 
We also printed a VMAC Detail Report , 
which included a VMAC Summary Report, 
followed by Group Details for each application 
group (see partial VMAC Detail Report in 
Figure 4). 
After these two reports were printed, the 
device was connected to a computer via its USB 
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Figure 2. Last Transaction Report
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and Ethernet ports, but the computer did not 
recognize that a device was connected. A wifi 
connection attempt also failed. This confirmed 
the entries on the VMAC detail report, which 
stated that Wifi and Ethernet were not 
supported on this terminal and the USB port 
was disabled. 
tlAC 
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Figure 3. VMAC Summary Report
Page 5
  
 
 
 
A Forensic First Look at a POS Device: ... 
vt1o 
OCTATL REPG!T 
. -.. 
.,_ 
--
•. ,,. ........ 
-w • 
-· -
~1 . 
.. . 
-
-· 
... 
~
CDFSL Proceedings 2019 
Figure 4. Partial VMAC Detail Report 
6.2 Digital extraction - Joint Test 
Action Group (JTAG) 
JT AG forensics is an advanced level data 
acquisition method which involves connecting to 
Test Access Ports (TAPs) on a device and 
instructing the processor to transfer the raw 
data stored on connected memory chips. When 
supported, JT AG is an extremely effective 
technique to extract a full physical image from 
devices that cannot be acquired with normal 
tools [2]. 
We attempted to conduct a JTAG 
examination but were unsuccessful. This was 
due to the test access ports being either not 
enabled on t he board or not supported on by 
JT AG equipment and configuration. 
6.3 Chip-off data. extraction 
The VeriFone XV610 devices were disassembled 
to expose the printed circuit board assemblies. 
The Printed Circuit Board Assemblies (PCBA) 
were inspected to identify non-volatile flash 
@ 2019 ADFSL 
memory components capable of data storage. 
For each POS device, a single Spansion flash 
memory chip model (S29)GL032N90FFI02 was 
located upon removal of the PCBA 
electromagnetic shielding. 
Research was completed to determine the 
Spansion GL032N90FFI02 particulars. The 
manufacturer technical datasheet for the 
S29GL-N family of devices was obtained from 
www.alldatasheet.com and reviewed. This 
revealed that the target chip is a NOR based 
flash memory component with a storage 
capacity of 4 megabytes. Specifically, the 
component is a 32-Mb device organized as 
2,097,152 words or 4,194,304 bytes with a 16-bit 
wide data bus. While the part is available in 
multiple chip packages, our target component 
was determined to be the 64-ball fortified BGA 
(ball grid array) package option (Figure 5). 
The UP&UP UP-828P chip programmer 
control software was then checked to confirm 
read/ imaging support for the target part. The 
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UP-828P did show explicit support for the 
GL032N90FFI02 and the necessary EBGA64P 
chip adapter was available. The control software 
was further checked to verify that the indicated 
part organization and capacity matched the 
values detailed in the chip datasheet. The 
control software presented the chip organization 
as "200000h x 16-bit" which corresponds to the 
4,194,304 bytes and 16-bit data bus as detailed 
in the datasheet . 
Figure 5. Vx610 Motherboard 
With imaging support verified , the chip-off 
acquisitions were performed. There was no 
visible chip underfill or coating, so no adhesive 
removal was necessary. The GL032N90FFI02 
chips were removed using a Zephyrtronics ZT-7 
hot air reflow unit per the following steps: 
The PCBA was mounted to the work 
cradle 
The PCBA was preheated 
Zephyrtronics Air Bath 
preheating unit @ 205°C 
using a 
digital 
RMA-223 flux paste was applied around 
and under the target chip 
The ZT-7 reflow unit nozzle was 
positioned over the target chip 
The ZT-7 reflow unit was engaged to 
ramp to a setpoint of 285°C 
The ZT-7 vacuum probe was activated 
for automatic chip removal 
@ 2019 ADFSL 
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The devices each had a 4MB flash memory 
chip (Figure 6) , and the extraction effort 
supplied both raw chip-off images as well as a 
copy where the byte order was reversed 
(RBO2). Data was extracted from both Vx610 
devices. 
Figure 6. Flash Memory Chip 
The target chips automatically lifted when 
the ZT-7 reflow unit nozzle temperature reached 
approximately 280°C. After cooling, the 
removed chips were cleaned using 99% isopropyl 
alcohol in an ultrasonic cleaner. Once clean , the 
chips were inspected for the presence of solder 
bridges, excess or insufficient solder amounts on 
each pad, and any other areas in need of 
correction. No corrections were required for the 
target chips. 
Each target chip was imaged using an 
UP & UP UP-828P universal chip programmer 
per the following steps: 
An EBGA64P chip package adapter was 
attached to the UP-828P programmer 
unit 
The UP-828P control software version 
2.0.4.8 was launched 
The control software was configured to 
read the target chip by selecting the 
S29GL032N90FFI02 chip profile 
Page 7
 • 
• 
• 
 
                                                     
1 kernel 1 hash: 
16521FB7808153E5A52E2994FD78BFF1  
kernel 2 hash: 
AF3A27BE64838A2FD10B79CE611BE558 
A Forensic First Look at a POS Device: ... 
The READ function was used to 
download the chip data into the control 
software buffer 
The VERIFY function was used to re-
read the chip data and compare it to the 
buffer contents 
The verified chip data was saved to a 
binary image file 
The Spansion GL032N90FFI02 chips were 
successfully imaged with no errors and the 
verification process yielded identical data. At 
4,194,304 bytes, the file sizes of the saved binary 
images matched the expected size as detailed in 
the chip manufacturer datasheet. This confirms 
that we acquired true and accurate forensic 
grade copies of each chip's data. 
The chip-off procedure and imaging was 
completed in accordance with accepted digital 
forensic industry standards and practices. MD5, 
SHAl, and SHA256 cryptographic hash values 
were calculated immediately after data 
acquisition and could be utilized to verify data 
integrity during analysis. 
After the chip-off data extraction, the 
extraction team performed a big/ little endian 
conversion by reversing the byte order so that 
ACSII strings would be human readable. It is 
these converted files that were subsequently 
analyzed. 
7. ANALYSIS AND 
RESULTS 
Both flash images were examined for PCI DSS 
protected data, specifically cardholder and 
authentication data. Using the available last 
transaction data to seed explicit searches, then 
searching the extracted data using regular 
expressions based on PCI DSS protected data 
and transaction data formats , we found no 
protected or transaction data in clear text ( such 
@ 2019 ADFSL 
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as card type, transaction amount , cardholder's 
name, last 4 digits of card number , etc.) in 
either image file . 
The two flash images were then examined in 
a hex editor for strings, similarities, and 
differences (image md5 hashes are different1) to 
establish what other information might be 
available. 
Extracted data indicates that both units ran 
the V erix v Operating System on 68k processors 
(Motorola 68000; 32-bit CISC). The kernel is 
located in bytes 0-65535 ( 64 KB); this is the first 
128 sectors assuming a 512-bytes sector size. 
Differences in these first 128 sectors began at 
byte offset 827 and continued at byte offsets as 
noted in the partial list below: 
827, 1167, 1910-1911 , 1918, 1923, 3119, 3563, 
3586-3587, 626-3627, 3983, 4027, 4071 , 4278-
4279, 4330-4331, 4731 , 4759, 4763, 4955, 5843 ... 
Byte differences at the locations above are 
all in the 4th ( if one) or 3rd and 4th octets ( if 
pair) of 4-octet groups; these look like op codes 
for a 32-bit processor, and the last byte or last 
two bytes of each 4-octet op code is/ are the op 
code's arguments (e.g. , memory address, 
register, etc.) [5]. Device serial numbers and 
kernel versions are near the end of the kernel 
block Cbytes 65310-65527). The serial number 
is the bold string starting with 212 or 213, and 
the kernel version is the bold string starting 
with V.QB. 
kernel 1: VX610 US M25654336USDD 
00000212-318-169160960790312806411 
10/ 02/ 2009 V.QB0111A3 "2.5 .2" 
kernel 2: VX610 US M25654336USDG 
00000213-696-415161351220312806411 
08/ 14/ 2009 V.QB0111A2 "2.5.lA" 
The flash file system begins after the kernel , 
located at byte offsets 65536-573440 (sector 128-
Page 8
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1119). The file system range was identified after 
finding the files as described below. Sector 1120 
starts with 0xFFs; non-0xFFs are at various 
sectors ( different in each image, but both start 
at sector 1152). To identify files in the images, 
file names were identified by first finding the 
load list (bytes 129640-12997 5 in these images). 
The load list contained the following filenames 
and is the same in both images. All files were 
found in the flash images except wizard.ram (I: 
indicates RAM file system). 
B: _ crypto.ram 
B:schedulr. bin 
B:iic. bin 
B:clk 6900.bin 
B:clk 3610.bin 
B: _ upgrade. tmp 
B: _ buf _mgr.bin 
B:bpr.bin 
B:coml .bin 
T: info.bin 
T:console. bin 
U:security.bin 
U:pipe_mgr.bin 
V:iccl.bin 
W:ipp.bin 
Y:usb host.bin 
Y:cdma usb.bin 
Y:usbd.bin 
Y:com2 .bin 
Y:com3 .bin 
Z:mag.bin 
Z:printer.bin 
Z:battery.bin 
!:wizard.ram 
@ 2019 ADFSL 
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File contents were found by first searching 
for the file name from the load list, then 
identifying a common precursor byte string that 
indicated the start of a new file. Most but not 
all files in the two images used constant 
precursor byte strings: kernel 1 used 0x09100214 
and kernel 2 used 0x09081411. Files were 
identified at the locations noted in Table 1 in 
the Appendix. Differences noted in bold red 
(file contents were not directly compared); 
start / end/ size are byte offsets in decimal; end 
and size are estimated based on the start of the 
next file. VLR files are screen messages. 
More files were found by searching for drive 
prefixes ( capital letter followed by colon), then 
looking for that file name in other locations. For 
these files below ( a partial list), file data follows 
the filename by about 40 bytes: 
certfile.sys 
modprof.s37 
ASC8X21.VFT 
ASC4Xl6.VFT 
SPUTIL.VFT 
VCS 8Xl6.vft 
VCSLOGOS.VFT 
VMAC.LIB 
cdma.p7s 
cdma.out 
Using strings and manual examination of 
the remainder of the data in the images ( sectors 
1120-end) revealed the following potentially 
useful but not fully explored items: 
Multiple locations in image 1 and 2: 
"PREDATOR" (user? also in ped.lib) 
Sector 1400 (image 1) and 1322 (image 2): 
FTP user (anonymous) and password 
(guest@vfi.com); 
Page 9
  
 
A Forensic First Look at a POS Device: ... 
Sector 1 773 ( image 1) and 1695 ( image 2): 
"Password:" and "66831" (a known default 
access code for downloads, time/ date changes, 
etc. [7]) 
Variable "*GO" in configuration file sets the 
startup program; both set to F:APLOAD.OUT 
(this file was not found on either flash image) 
Sector 1389 (image 1), 1311 (image 2): 
Banshee.Carlos Only.CO561 
Only .. Carlos+ CO561 ... . MC56 Only ... MC55 
Only ... EM3420 Only.CO710 
Only .. Carlos+ MC56.Carlos+ MC55.Carlos+ EM 
3420 ... Carlos+ CO710 .... Eisenhower 
The rest of the image files contained mostly 
compiled code and suspected encrypted data 
(based on data entropy); the rest contained 
clear text entries of error messages, 
informational messages, initialization messages, 
menu items, file names and locations, 
configuration settings, and device information. 
8. DISCUSSION AND 
CONCLUSION 
The analysis results suggest that most of the 
data is either binary code or encrypted data, 
and the clear text appears to contain only 
informational and error messages, configuration 
information, and some access information. 
IP information such as network 
configuration (DNS, DHCP, IP addresses, etc.) 
were in clear text , as was an FTP username and 
password, presumably used for non-sensitive 
downloads. 
The last transaction could be printed, which 
indicates it is present in the non-volatile flash 
memory. However, no cardholder or 
transactional data was found in clear text in the 
extracted flash images, which likely indicates 
that transactional and cardholder data that is 
retained is also encrypted. Given that no 
sensitive authentication data was printed, no 
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evidence of PCI DSS data storage violations 
were identified. 
9. FUTURE RESEARCH 
This paper analyzed a single model of POS 
system, and the analysis was has only begun. 
We intend to more fully explore and analyze the 
acquired image files and to analyze additional 
POS devices. 
Additional analysis will also examine the 
Verix v Operating System and code apparently 
running on these POS systems. 
Lastly, we hope to acquire similar POS 
devices and their accompanying payment 
system services so we can control the 
configuration data and transaction data in order 
to trace it through the system and enable more 
explicit searches. 
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   kernel 1 kernel 2 
filename start end size start end size 
flashmgr.ram 65600 75519 9920 65600 75519 9920 
_crypto.ram 75568 79603 4036 75568 79603 4036 
schedulr.bin 79652 102399 22748 79652 102399 22748 
iic.bin 102448 103727 1280 102448 103727 1280 
clk_6900.bin 103776 109223 5448 103776 109223 5448 
clk_3610.bin 109272 115511 6240 109272 115511 6240 
_upgrade.tmp 115560 123391 7832 115560 123391 7832 
_buf_mgr.bin 123440 124871 1432 123440 124871 1432 
bpr.bin 124920 125487 568 124920 125487 568 
com1_.bin 125536 129591 4056 125536 129591 4056 
loadlist.sys 129640 131087 1448 129640 131087 1448 
sysmode.out 131136 196623 65488 131136 196623 65488 
pedgrdfa.out 196672 202767 6096 196672 202767 6096 
ped.lib 202816 226495 23680 202816 226495 23680 
_info.bin 226544 230211 3668 226544 230211 3668 
console.bin 230260 262159 31900 230260 262159 31900 
unzip.out 262208 270375 8168 262208 270375 8168 
security.bin 270424 308235 37812 270424 308283 37860 
pipe_mgr.bin 308284 327695 19412 308332 327695 19364 
smipp.out 327744 332815 5072 327744 332815 5072 
smresdl.out 332864 339983 7120 332864 339983 7120 
icc_diag.out 340032 356999 16968 340032 356999 16968 
icc1.bin 357048 393231 36184 357048 393231 36184 
sys.lib 393280 436803 43524 393280 436735 43456 
ipp.bin 436852 459855 23004 436784 459855 23072 
usb_host.bin 459904 473155 13252 459904 473155 13252 
cdma_usb.bin 473204 482215 9012 473204 482215 9012 
usbd.bin 482264 491563 9300 482264 491563 9300 
com2_.bin 491612 496347 4736 491612 496347 4736 
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Appendix 1: File Location in the Kernels 
Table 1 
File Locations in the K emels 
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   kernel 1 kernel 2 
filename start end size start end size 
com3_.bin 496396 524303 27908 496396 524303 27908 
timezone.vlr 524352 529651 5300 524352 529651 5300 
sm_text.vlr 529700 536195 6496 529700 536195 6496 
dlerr.vlr 536244 536595 352 536244 536595 352 
dlmsg.vlr 536644 537255 612 536644 537255 612 
mag.bin 537304 545211 7908 537304 545211 7908 
printer.bin 545260 564907 19648 545260 564907 19648 
battery.bin 564956 572927 7972 564956 572927 7972 
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Appendix 2: PCI DSS Quick Reference Guide: Protect Cardholder Data (PCI 2018, 14-15) 
Cardholder data refers to any information printed, processed, transmitted or stored in any form 
on a payment card. Entities accepting payment cards are expected to protect cardholder data and 
to prevent its unauthorized use - whether the data is printed or stored locally, or transmitted over 
an internal or public network to a remote server or service provider. 
Requirement 3: Protect stored cardholder data 
Cardholder data should not be stored unless it's necessary to meet the needs of the business. 
Sensitive data on the magnetic stripe or chip must never be stored after authorization. If your 
organization stores the Primary Account Number (PAN), it is crucial to render it unreadable (see 
3.4, and Table 2 for guidelines). 
3.1 
Limit cardholder data storage and retention time to that which is required for business, legal, 
and/ or regulatory purposes, as documented in your data retention policy. Purge unnecessary stored 
data at least quarterly. 
3.2 
Do not store sensitive authentication data after authorization ( even if it is encrypted). See table 
below. Render all sensitive authentication data unrecoverable upon completion of the authorization 
process. Issuers and related entities may store sensitive authentication data if there is a business 
justification, and the data is stored securely. 
3.3 
Mask PAN when displayed ( the first six and last four digits are the maximum number of digits 
you may display) , so that only authorized people with a legitimate business need can see more than 
the first six/ last four digits of the PAN. This does not supersede stricter requirements that may be 
in place for displays of cardholder data, such as on a point-of-sale receipt. 
3.4 
Render PAN unreadable anywhere it is stored - including on portable digital media, backup 
media, in logs, and data received from or stored by wireless networks. Technology solutions for this 
requirement may include strong one-way hash functions of the entire PAN, truncation, index tokens 
with securely stored pads, or strong cryptography. 
3.5 
Document and implement procedures to protect any keys used for encryption of cardholder data 
from disclosure and misuse. 
3.6 
Fully document and implement key management processes and procedures for cryptographic 
keys used for encryption of cardholder data. 
3.7 
Ensure that related security policies and operational procedures are documented, in use, and 
known to all affected parties. 
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Table 2: 
Guidelines for Cardholder Data Elements (PCI 2018, p15} 
Data Element Storage Perm ltted 
Pr"mary Account 
Yes Number (PAN), 
Cardhol!der Cardho1 der Name Yes 
Data 
Service Code Yes 
Expi ratiion Date Yes 
FulllTrack Data2 No 
Sensltilve 
Aulhentlcatlon CAV2/C)IC2/CI./V2/CID3 No 
Data1 
PIN/IPIN IBl!ock' No 
1 Senf ive au.tllentic.atim1 data, must not be stored after authorization ,(even, if enorypted) 
2 Fi1.1II trad: data fmm the m.1gnetic .str(pe. eqµival'.ent data, mi the chip. m elsewhere. 
3 The three- or fom-<ilgit value [Printed on tlle front m baok of a payment card 
CDFSL Proceedings 2019 
Render Stored Data 
Unreadable per 
Requlreme:nt 3A 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
Cannot store per 
Requirement 3.2 
Cannot store per 
Requirement 3.2 
Cannot store per 
Requirement 3.2 
4 Personal lde11tifa:ar on Number entered bv cardho d:er dml11g a trans:actio11, and/or enorypted PIN blook: present-within the 
transaction message 
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